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Obviously, what lies ahead is quite uncertain, but it seems 
clear that the world is entering a prolonged downturn. 
Falls in equity prices and difficulties in access to credit are 
compounded by falling price levels and reductions in demand 
which will flow on to reductions in output, company failures 
and increased unemployment. How bad it will be we do not 
know, but financial shocks on the scale that we have observed 
take years rather than months to work out.
Second, although the international forces acting on our 
economy are beyond our control, we are able to influence their 
impact on the New Zealand economy. Mistakes are going to 
be made, but hopefully we can minimise those by ongoing 
dialogue within and beyond the policy-making community. 
At times of  crisis those in positions of  responsibility are 
required to make large judgements at short notice. They 
quite reasonably expect continuing support, but that support 
needs to be critical. There are difficult and contentious issues 
in front of  us, which demand constructive attention and 
ongoing dialogue.
Balance of payments deficits and the net international 
investment position
The Reserve Bank’s 2008 Financial Stability Report discusses 
New Zealand’s external position. Three features stand out.
1. Since 2000, and indeed for many years before that, 
New Zealand’s current account balance (the net balance 
between exports and imports of  goods and services and 
international factor payments) has been in deficit. The 
deficit deteriorated during the decade and for the last few 
years has averaged around 8 to 9% of  GDP.
2. Current account deficits have to be financed by drawing 
on overseas capital in one form or another. Total net 
international liabilities have been slowly rising, from a 
low point equal to 75% of  GDP at the end of  2001 to a 
contemporary high of  89% in March 2008.
3. The proportion of  net international liabilities accounted 
for by net international debt has been rising relative to 
that part reflecting equity investment (including foreign 
direct investment). The ratio of  net international debt to 
GDP has risen from around 60% in 2003 to 83% now.
Debts must of  course be serviced. Net international 
liabilities on the scale reported above imply a heavy servicing 
requirement. It is a striking fact of  recent New Zealand history, 
again focusing on the period from 2000, that net international 
investment income payments, which have varied between 6 
Introduction
The origins of  the current international crisis lie outside New Zealand, but 
New Zealand’s high level of  net international liabilities has long exposed 
us to the possibility of  a sharp correction. In what follows I focus on some 
longstanding problems, to which I see no easy answers, which are likely  
to be with us for many years. But first, two introductory comments.
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and 8% of  GDP, are roughly equivalent on average to the 
balance of  payments current deficit as a whole. In contrast, 
exports and imports of  goods and services, whilst fluctuating, 
have been in approximate balance over this time. In a very 
real sense New Zealand has been borrowing to pay the 
servicing requirements of  its international debt.
This relationship is also illustrated in the Financial Stability 
Report (Reserve Bank of  New Zealand, 2008, Figure 4.1), 
which shows the approximately equivalent total values of  
cumulative current account deficits and the parallel increase 
in the net foreign liabilities of  banks operating in New 
Zealand. Implicitly, New Zealand has become habituated 
to a steady inflow of  bank-mediated funding from foreign 
residents to finance continuing balance of  payments deficits.
Continued access to this flow has now been put at risk by the 
international financial crisis. The New Zealand government, 
following other countries, has introduced opt-in guarantee 
schemes in an attempt to reassure foreign investors that 
deposits with New Zealand banks are secure. How effective 
this will be has yet to be seen. All systems of  guarantees have 
their downsides, including untoward incentive effects, and 
there must be some risk that the guarantee may be called, 
imposing significant costs on government, taxpayers and 
citizens.
Net international investment positions and interest rates
New Zealand is not alone in having a large ratio of  net 
international liabilities to GDP but, as is apparent from 
Figure 1, it is among the leaders in the field. Figure 1 is drawn 
from research in progress on the relationship between net 
international investment positions and national interest rates 
(Rose, 2007). The clear implication of  the scatter plot of  
mean values for the period 1980–2004 is that countries with 
higher levels of  net international indebtedness have higher 
interest rates. Broadly, countries that hold roughly equal 
amounts of  international liabilities and assets can access 
international short-term money at around 3%. Countries 
such as Switzerland, which has net assets equivalent to 100% 
of  GDP, can tap into markets at very low rates. Countries 
such as New Zealand find themselves paying significantly 
higher rates of  interest. Effectively the market is pricing 
country and/or currency risk into national interest rates.
Whilst the existence of  country or currency risk margins 
is widely noted, much theoretical discussion on the balance 
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of  payments proceeds as if  they did not exist or are of  
little consequence. Standard textbook models typically see 
balance of  payments deficits as reflecting essentially short-
term inter-country differences in investment opportunities 
and savings patterns. With a common core ‘world interest 
rate’, capital flows between countries are seen as responding 
to those differences, leading to changes in investment, output 
and income patterns which in time enable the servicing and 
repayment of  debt. 
There are substantial elements of  truth within this story, but 
it is not the whole story. A number of  writers have suggested 
that national interest rates will contain risk premia related 
to national balance sheets, such as are evident in the cross-
country data in Figure 1. The key contrast between the core 
model story and our data-based exploration is the slope of  the 
interest rate function. In the standard model the world interest 
rate is a constant, horizontal line. Figure 1 shows a sloping 
function. Interest rates rise with increases in net liabilities. 
The standard two-country model focuses on national 
flows of  investment and savings, and the current account 
balance as the flow difference between them at the prevailing 
world interest rate. In our graph of  the actual data we are 
looking at the net international investment positions resulting 
from the accumulation of  current account balances over 
time. It is this long accumulation of  a stock of  international 
net liabilities that generates risk premia.
The scale of  the effect of  net international investment 
positions on interest rates can only be approximated because 
interest rates reflect a number of  influences, but on my 
estimation New Zealand’s current level of  international net 
liabilities implies a wedge of  something like 1½% above the 
short-term interest rate levels that would prevail were our 
international liabilities and assets in balance. In fact, New 
Zealand’s short-term interest rates have, since 1990, averaged 
some 2¾% above the average level of  those prevailing in 
our TWI partner countries (the United States, Euroland, 
Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom). What might 
explain the additional element within the overall differential? 
Again, many factors are likely to be present, but some of  
us argue that the central and all but exclusive focus of  New 
Zealand monetary policy on inflation control is a significant 
cause. Note that this influence reflects both the design of  the 
statutory rules under which the Reserve Bank operates and 
the choices made by the bank in operating those rules.
I don’t propose to develop that argument here. Instead 
I shall focus on the implications of  the large existing real 
interest rate differential, whatever its cause may be. I note 
four effects. The importance of  each of  these needs to be 
assessed within an appropriate framework.
1. Because the country/currency risk premium increases 
with the level of  debt, the rate of  debt service payments 
increases at an accelerating rate as national debt levels 
increase. The effective constraint on ever-increasing net 
international investment position (NIIP)/GDP ratios is 
imposed by the cost of  servicing rather than the interest 
rate alone.
2. Interest rates present investors with a screening test. 
The rates of  return that an investor expects to realise by 
undertaking an investment need to be sufficient to service 
the debt used to finance that investment. High interest 
rates reduce the number of  investments that pass this 
test and thus act to reduce the level of  capital formation. 
They thus inhibit growth.
3. Rates of  return on real productive investments are 
constrained, at any point in time, by the technologies 
currently available. High interest rates encourage 
investors to focus on markets in which there are apparent 
opportunities for high returns and thus, arguably, bias 
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Figure 1: Net international investment positions and real interest rates
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investment towards areas in which there are prospects for 
gains from asset inflation rather than from increases in 
productive capacity.
4. High real interest rates have an observable effect on 
nominal and real exchange rates (the real exchange rate 
is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for differential 
movements in prices between New Zealand and the other 
countries party to the exchange rate).
I make no further comment on the first three effects except 
to say that I think they are problem areas. The exchange rate 
linkage, which is illustrated in Figure 2, is, however, central to 
my story.
Interest rates and exchange rates
The clear implication of  Figure 2 is that higher New Zealand 
interest rates (measured relative to the weighted average of  
our principal trading partners and displayed on the horizontal 
axis) induce higher exchange rates. The scale of  the effect 
is substantial and can be approximated by a simple linear 
regression:
 RERTWI = 41.08 + 6.853*INTEREST R2 adjusted = 0.58
 (0.000)  (0.000) p-values in parentheses
where RERTWI is the International Monetary Fund’s real 
exchange rate index for New Zealand scaled to give the 
same mean as the nominal TWI for the period 1990–2007, 
and INTEREST measures the difference in real short-term 
interest rates between New Zealand and in the countries 
within the TWI basket, appropriately weighted. Real rates 
are nominal rates deflated by changes in consumer prices.
A one percentage point change in the real interest rate 
differential (e.g. from 2% to 3%) shifts the real TWI by about 
6.9 points relative to its 1990–2007 mean of  60.1. Absent 
the differential, the TWI would, implicitly, fall to around 41. 
These are very substantial effects.
As noted, the interest rate differential reflects a number 
of  influences. On the numbers sketched above the high level 
of  net international liabilities contributes more than half  that 
differential, with the rest being due to monetary policy rules, 
application of  those rules, and other influences whatever 
those might be.
Exchange rates and the balance of payments
By common consent the exchange rate is an important 
variable influencing the level and pattern of  import and 
export flows. High exchange rates tend to encourage imports 
and to discourage exports. However, floating exchange rates 
are highly variable, so that it is difficult to trace their actual 
impact on trade flows. In an earlier paper (Rose, 2001) I used 
lagged relationships over three-year periods in an attempt to 
see through this short-term variability. I explored the influence 
of  exchange rates as one of  a set of  competing influences 
on the levels of  exports and imports over three-year time 
periods. Export and import data were each disaggregated 
into nine groups. Other modelled factors included the cyclical 
behaviour of  capital formation, the phasing down of  import 
protection and technological change.
The study needs updating but the results remain relevant. 
The main findings were that exchange rate levels appeared 
to exert a significant influence on the level of  exports but 
had little influence on imports. Variability in the exchange 
rate appeared to inhibit exports and, to a lesser extent, to 
encourage imports. The quantitative effect suggested by 
the regressions was that a rise in the real TWI by 10 units, 
e.g. from 50.0 to 60.0, ‘would lead to a deterioration in the 
balance of  payments, stemming from changes in export and 
import ratios, equal to about 2.7% of  total supply or about 
3.6% of  GDP’. In addition, I concluded that variability in the 
exchange rate over the reference period of  the study, 1988 to 
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Figure 2: Interest rates and the exchange rate
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2000, was likely to have caused an annual negative effect on 
the balance of  exports and imports equal to about 1.5% of  
GDP. Taken together these are substantial effects, amounting 
to some 5% of  GDP, which as it happens is the average value 
of  the current account deficit for the period 1990 to date.
A scatter plot of  the real exchange rate against the 
current account balance provides another perspective on this 
story. There is a clear suggestion of  a negative relationship 
between the exchange rate and the balance of  payments. A 
linear function fitted to this data suggests a 
somewhat weaker influence than implied 
by my 2001 paper. In this case a 10 point 
change in the real exchange rate index, 
around its mean value of  60, would imply a 
deterioration in the balance of  payments by 
around 2% rather than the 3½% suggested 
in the previous paragraph.
Clearly, there is a margin of  uncertainty 
here, but even the lower of  the two estimates 
is, in context, a significant number.
The story so far
To this point I have argued that New Zealand’s very high level 
of  net international liabilities introduces a risk premium into 
New Zealand’s interest rate structure, which is additional to the 
upward pressures inherent in the monetary policy framework. 
Higher interest rates tend to raise the real exchange rate, which 
in turn acts to increase the balance of  payments deficit. We 
now complete the circle. Balance of  payments deficits must 
perforce be financed, and this financing adds to liabilities and 
so tends to increase the NIIP/GDP ratio.
Changes in the NIIP/GDP ratio
Again, this is no more than a tendency because the balance 
of  payments is only one of  three components driving changes 
in the ratio of  net international assets to GDP. The three 
components are (1) the rate of  change in nominal GDP 
(which itself  is the product of  the real rate of  growth and the 
rate of  inflation); (2) the capital flows arising from the balance 
of  payments; and (3) revaluations of  the opening stocks of  
international assets and liabilities.
t
t
t
t
tt
t
t
t
Y
R
Y
C
rY
N
Y
N
++
+
×=
−
−
)1(
1
1
1
 
where
Nt = net international investment position at end  
of  year t,
Yt = gross domestic product in year t,
r = the annual rate of  growth in nominal GDP  
in year t,
Ct = capital flows financing the current account balance 
in year t, and
Rt = revaluations of  international assets and liabilities in 
year t.
Interest rates and other rates of  return lie behind each 
component of  this equation. Rates of  return are related to 
the rate of  productivity change and thus help determine r. 
Their importance within the current account balance is an 
increasing function of  the absolute value of  the NIIP/GDP 
ratio. Finally, they are important determinants of  the present 
value of  international assets and liabilities so that changes in 
interest rates and other rates of  return are important drivers 
of  R.
‘Wedges’ between world and national interest rates 
contribute to the evolution of  net international investment 
positions, which, in turn, exert a significant influence on 
national interest rates. This circularity raises questions as to 
causal direction, but the persistence of  NIIP ratios and the 
short-term and cyclical variability of  interest rates suggests that 
the predominant causation is from the former to the latter.
That said, interest rates do help to determine NIIP 
positions, both directly through their impact on international 
factor flows, and indirectly by their influence on exchange 
rates. This mutually-reinforcing process raises questions about 
the time spans and processes by which countries such as New 
Zealand, with large negative NIIP balances, can improve 
their position.
New Zealand’s net international liabilities exceed 85% 
of  GDP and recent current account deficits have averaged 
around 8% of  GDP. The usual inter-temporal borrowing 
story implies that net international liabilities will at some 
point begin to reduce. Suppose that we hypothesise movement 
towards a balanced net external asset position over a 50-year 
period, and suppose that we could find a financial institution 
prepared to consolidate the present value of  all New Zealand’s 
international liabilities and assets in a single table mortgage 
at a real interest rate of  5%. Servicing that mortgage would 
imply that we, our children and our children’s children would 
be required to run a 50-year balance of  payments surplus in 
excess of  5% of  GDP.
But this is too pessimistic a conclusion. In reality, inflation 
will provide part of  the answer. Even in contemporary low-
inflation environments, inflation undermines the value of  
debt denominated in nominal terms. Fifty years’ inflation at 
3% will reduce the real value of  a debt by more than three-
quarters.
Writing on this topic 12 months ago, I concluded that it 
seems inescapable that for several decades New Zealand will 
be exposed to the possibility that one or other external shock 
Possibly the international crisis will be short-
lived, although that seems unlikely. Hopefully 
our systems will handle it better rather than 
worse ... 
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will interfere with movement towards a more easily sustainable 
NIIP position and deliver a destabilising revaluation of  
international assets and liabilities. That exposure heightens 
the importance of  ongoing attention to issues of  prudential 
management and to international linkages and arrangements 
that help spread country risk. (Rose, 2007)
We are now experiencing such a shock. Possibly the 
international crisis will be short-lived, although that seems 
unlikely. Hopefully our systems will handle it better rather 
than worse, but clearly we have to expect difficult times.
Implications
Looking through that period of  adjustment and beyond, 
two major issues stand out, both of  which require renewed 
theoretical attention.
1. The current crisis underlines, and indeed amplifies, the 
risks inherent in running high levels of  net international 
liabilities. What lessons should we draw from that? What 
policies have contributed to this exposed position and 
what policies might have avoided it? Looking ahead, what 
policy adjustments are needed to reduce New Zealand’s 
degree of  exposure to external credit shocks? A theoretical 
puzzle underlies these questions. New Zealand’s exposed 
international investment position is the outcome of  a 
myriad of  individual transactions, in which pairs of  
transactors have agreed to exchange capital sums now 
against future streams of  income. If  those transactions 
were by and large well informed, should we conclude that 
the overall outcome is in fact acceptable and sustainable? 
If  not, at what points along the way does the logic break 
down?
2. Secondly, in my view the floating exchange rate regime has 
itself  contributed to the evolution of  New Zealand’s highly 
indebted position. Figure 3 displays annual values for the 
real exchange rate (IMF real exchange rate series scaled 
to mean of  TWI for the same period). The pronounced 
cycles in the real exchange rate are themselves a direct 
disincentive to exporting and, compounding with the 
wedge introduced to the average exchange rate by New 
Zealand’s risk premium, have contributed directly to our 
level of  international liabilities.
A floating exchange rate has of  course many advantages, 
and I do not suggest we should discard it lightly, or that we 
have to hand a ready-made, well-articulated alternative. We 
do not. But I suggest we do need to look carefully at the links 
between the current floating regime and our debt position, to 
assess the workings of  floating regimes over time spans that 
include major shocks such as the present, and to devote time 
to the articulation of  alternatives.
So I end with a standard call for more research and 
discussion on alternative policy regimes. I don’t apologise 
for that. These are theoretically contested areas and it is 
important that those with different views engage in discussion 
and debate. Meantime, people in positions of  authority in 
times of  crisis must perforce make their judgement calls on the 
basis of  their understanding of  relevant theory. The research 
community’s job is to argue, test and develop that theory.
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 Figure 3: The real exchange rate
